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1. Introduction 
Peer-to-peer lending (P2P) is an online process where borrowers and lenders meet 
directly. Online platforms provide individuals with alternative source of finance where they 
can shop freely for borrowing and investment opportunities with increased convenience 
and lower cost. However, this cost efficiency may result in a questionable credit check 
process and increased risk of fraud.1 The peer-to-peer lending industry started in 2005 
and ever since online platforms are steadily becoming an important part of the credit 
market. Although online platforms are growing at an increased pace, there has not been 
a proper unified regulatory framework for the industry. Furthermore, the absence of a 
proper background check inherently increases the risk of information falsification. 
Marketplace users are more likely to misreport personal information either by mistake or 
intentionally.  
In this paper, we study the prevalence of income misreporting by means of rounding in 
the online market. We offer an insight into the effect of behavioral biases on the 
performance of online borrowers using a unique dataset from Lending Club (LC), one of 
the largest US-based peer-to-peer platforms. Our data contain information on almost 10 
million loan-month observations pertaining to about 673,000 loans. It allows us to observe 
the monthly performance of loans originated between 2008 and 2015. Furthermore, it 
gives detailed information on borrowers’ credit and loan characteristics.  
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, the existence of rounding has 
been established in self-reported data with extra spikes in the data observed at numbers 
ending in zero (Pudney 2008, A'Hearn et al. 2009, Manski and Molinari 2010). 
Furthermore, the predilection for round numbers is evident in the stock market and 
analysts’ forecasts (Herrmann and Thomas 2005, Bollen and Pool 2009, Dechow and 
You 2012). Behavioral literature attributes rounding behavior to an availability heuristic, 
number preference, recall error, and lack of information (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 
Tarrant et al. 1993, Ormerod and Ritchie 2007).  
                                                     
1 Although marketplace lenders usually pull applicants’ credit files from credit agencies, this could differ for 
self-reported data as they may not verify all personal data (e.g., income, employment status) reported by 
applicants. 
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In an unregulated market, it is expected that rounding is a predominant phenomenon, 
particularly when it is associated with increased benefit for the individual. The level of 
income can be a determining factor in lending decisions; therefore, it is the variable most 
susceptible to misreporting. Rounding behavior may be associated with unobserved 
borrowers’ risk; Gerardi et al. (2010) suggest that cognitively constrained borrowers and 
those with low numerical ability may experience worse loan outcomes. In this paper, we 
specifically focus on the impact of income rounding on loans’ performance in the online 
market. Self-reported data do not usually give exact information about the extent of 
rounding (Manski and Molinari 2010). However, a significant number of applicants who 
round their income, may distort the distribution of income (Czajka and Denmead 2008). 
This may create several spikes in the reported income at rounded values. We observe 
extra spikes around income multiples of $5,000 in our sample, therefore, we consider 
$5,000 as our main rounding heuristic. Financially ill-informed borrowers are more likely 
to round, as they may be less precise than those who are more financially experienced. 
Therefore, the propensity to round may be a function of borrowers’ financial expertise. 
We find that borrowers with a long credit history are less likely to round their income. This 
pattern is apparent across different modes of rounding. 
Our analysis also relates to the literature on the performance of loans. Most studies of 
performance focus on the impact of various loan and borrowers’ characteristics in the 
mortgage market (Clapp et al. 2006, Danis and Pennington-Cross 2008, Keys et al. 2010, 
Demyanyk and Hemert 2011). We define loans as delinquent if in a given month they are 
31-120 days late in payment, default or are charged off. Our results for the binary 
outcome model suggest that rounding may result in worse loan performance. The 
occurrence of rounding significantly increases the probability that a current loan become 
delinquent in a given month. Furthermore, we categorize borrowers in two groups: those 
who are more likely to round into those who make errors in their recall of earnings, whom 
we term “recallers” and those who strategically round, here termed “opportunists”. This 
grouping is based on borrowers’ homeownership and credit risk. The results indicate that 
rounding by more financially stable borrowers is not associated with worse performance,  
while rounding by individuals with less stable income as well as higher risk borrowers 
have a positive impact on loans’ delinquency.  
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Additionally, the volatility of changes in monthly credit score can be a measure of 
borrowers’ uncertainty. Our findings suggest that borrowers who are likely to round their 
income figures experience higher monthly fluctuations in their credit score than those 
who may have reported precise figures. We employ a competing risk model to 
complement our findings for the binary outcome model and to account for different loan 
outcomes. We find that rounding is significantly associated with worse outcomes. 
Borrowers who round their income are more likely to end up in delinquency than to stay 
up-to-date with their payments. One way to mitigate the consequences of rounding is to 
compensate investors for the extra risk. We find that loans are not priced in a way that 
reflects the risk associated with rounding. Borrowers who round their income have a 
lower interest rate than those who do not round. This is also observed for the non-price 
term of loans; misreported borrowers have larger loans and longer maturity. 
The study currently closest to our paper is Garmaise (2015). While Garmaise (2015) 
studies the performance of mortgage borrowers who over-report their asset level, we 
focus on the outcome of income rounding. In the lending process, income may be a signal 
of borrowers’ ability to make payments and thus, have an effect on loan terms. 
Furthermore, we focus on online loans where misreporting is highly likely. To the best of 
our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate misreporting in peer-to-peer lending 
using a complete loan dataset. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview 
of the peer-to-peer market. In section 3, we discuss the related literature on loan 
performance and the psychology of rounding. Section 4 gives an overview of the data 
used with descriptive statistics. Section 5 illustrates the specification used in the course 
of our analysis. We discuss results in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
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2. Peer-to-Peer industry 
The peer-to-peer industry started in 2005 with the launch of Zopa, the first online 
marketplace, in the UK.2 A year later, the US joined the industry with the launch of 
Prosper followed by Lending Club (LC). By the end of 2015, LC has facilitated around 
$16 billion in loan originations of which $3.3 billion were through issuance of loans’ notes, 
$5.5 billion certificates issued by trusts, and $7.2 billion invested by institutional investors 
through whole loan sales.3 In 2015, LC issued around $8.5 billion loans, which are nearly 
double the loans originated in 2014. PwC (2015) estimates that the online market may 
reach $150 billion or more by 2025.  
Marketplace lenders distinguish themselves from conventional banks in a number of 
ways. Internet-based platforms may reach under-served segments that are usually 
difficult for banks to finance. In addition, the decision-making process in online platforms 
is expeditious, owing to the implemented data and technology driven assessment 
models. Due to the online nature of these platforms, they are cost efficient because of 
lower overhead and transaction costs. This cost saving is then passed to the end-user. 
Furthermore, online lenders are highly transparent, as most loan data are publicly 
available for marketplace users to analyze and take their investment decisions. More 
importantly, online platforms provide investors an opportunity to diversify their risk across 
different types of loans and various platforms. Similarly, borrowers usually do not rely on 
a single investor and thus have greater chances of being funded. Finally, the ease and 
convenience of the credit process make online marketplaces appealing to most users 
(PwC 2015). 
However, this ease of lending is accompanied by inherent risk. Since most 
marketplaces do not put their own capital at risk, investors are the ones who bear the 
whole loss in case of default (Li 2015).4 As with any online activity, there is an increased 
risk of fraud, cyber-security, and identity theft. Online platforms may have the incentive 
to understate the risk associated with online lending, which may mislead marketplace 
users (Verstein 2011). Moreover, the credit check process in online lending could be 
                                                     
2 https://www.zopa.com/about [Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
3 http://ir.lendingclub.com/Cache/c33047201.html [Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
4 However, online lenders report all default and late payment cases to the credit bureaus. 
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doubtful, as most platforms do not verify all information provided by the applicants, which 
may explain the low underwriting costs in online markets (Carney 2016). Marketplace 
users are exposed to illiquidity risk as only some platforms provide access to secondary 
market.5 Therefore, users face higher default risk as notes can only be transferred to 
lenders on the same platform and if lenders could not reach an appropriate price, they 
are obliged to hold those notes until maturity (Verstein 2011, Moenninghoff and Wieandt 
2013). Lastly, the virtual aspect of the relation between marketplace users can be a cause 
of mistrust in the online process.  
In the US, the regulation of marketplaces has been controversial. Each loan issued 
through marketplace lenders has to register as a security with the U.S Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC regulation has been criticized as highly rigorous 
and thus unable to cope with the rapidly innovating industry. Furthermore, it is claimed 
that this imposes an extra burden on marketplace lenders rather than providing them with 
a properly regulated environment.6 In a proactive move, the US Department of Treasury 
has requested marketplace lenders and analysts to provide information about their 
business model to allow better understanding of the growing industry.7 Most of the 
responses received called for initiating an independent regulating body that fully grasps 
the fundamentals of the online industry. 
 
3. Literature Review  
3.1. Performance of Loans in Peer-to-Peer Lending  
The peer-to-peer industry is evolving and the research in this area is still scarce. We 
contribute to the growing peer-to-peer literature by providing empirical evidence on how 
the behavioral aspect of marketplace users may affect loan’s performance. The first 
stream of literature investigates the performance of online loans relative to the borrower’s 
credit characteristics. The most critical aspect that concerns investors in the lending 
process is whether a loan will end up in default or not. Emekter et al. (2015) find 
                                                     
5 Investors in LC and Prosper have only access to FOLIOfn, an online secondary market. 
6 Describing the SEC regulations as an “ill-fitting framework”, Verstein (2011) discusses how the SEC 
regulation might be considered as a risk to the new industry and its possible consequences. 
7 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0116.aspx [Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
 6 
significant disparity in credit characteristics between defaulted and current loans. Further, 
revolving line utilization, debt-to-income ratio and credit score significantly predict default. 
Comparing the calculated theoretical and assigned interest rate by LC, Emekter et al. 
(2015) find that the price of high-risk loans is not enough to reimburse investors in case 
of default. Moreover, Serrano-Cinca et al. (2015) demonstrate that the credit score given 
by LC is the most significant predictor of default. Theoretically, the credit score should be 
the best predictor of a borrower’s default. However, using data from Prosper, Iyer et al. 
(2015) provide evidence that the predictability power of the interest rate outperforms the 
credit score by 45 percent.  
Beside the credit characteristics of debtors, the mechanism of the online platform may 
have an effect on the default rate. For instance, Prosper allows users to form online 
borrowing groups where members can endorse and invest in each other’s loans. On the 
one hand, Freedman and Jin (2014) find that loans to a group are more likely to default 
and less likely to prepay than those to individuals. Moreover, they find that being a group 
member and getting endorsement from a friend are associated with a lower interest rate 
and higher probability of funding. On the other hand, Everett (2015) finds that loans listed 
with a group affiliation tend to have a lower default rate than those without group links. 
The second strand of literature focuses on analyzing the role of soft information in the 
peer-to-peer market and its impact on the success of loan funding. Soft information can 
be an important factor in investors’ decision to fund a loan or not (Dorfleitner et al. 2016).8 
Several findings support the existence of discrimination in online platforms. Pope and 
Sydnor (2011) use applicants’ photographs from Prosper to determine applicants’ 
demographic characteristics. They argue that black borrowers are less likely to receive 
funding and that they were charged interest 60-80 points higher than did white applicants. 
Interestingly, lenders discriminate against the elderly and give preference to female 
applicants. Lin et al. (2013) provide further evidence of discrimination against men 
applicants.9 On the contrary, employing several proxies of funding success from a 
German platform, Barasinska and Schäfer (2014) failed to find such discrimination 
                                                     
8 Dorfleitner et al. (2016) analyze the effect of misspelled words, text length and positive words in loan 
applications on funding probability. 
9 Ravina (2012) obtains similar results in support of taste-based discrimination, she conclude that there is 
presence of the beauty effect using data from Prosper. 
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between female and male applicants. They argue that discrimination may be platform 
rather than market specific.  
Information asymmetry may be a prevalent problem in the online market due to the 
anonymity of borrowers, which may put lenders’ investment at risk (Yum et al. 2012, 
Emekter et al. 2015). However, the requirement for borrowers to share more financial 
and personal information can mitigate this risk (Feng et al. 2015). Accordingly, Freedman 
and Jin (2008) find that the average funding rate by Prosper has increased since it started 
asking borrowers to disclose more information. Social networking such as group 
borrowing can be another way of reducing information asymmetry in the online market; 
due to their shared liability, group leaders may act as an effective monitoring mechanism 
(Yum et al. 2012, Freedman and Jin 2014). Moreover, having online friendship ties can 
act as a signal of the borrower’s quality and thus, may mitigate adverse selection and 
improve loan performance (Lin et al. 2013). However, Freedman and Jin (2014) find that 
this tool has drawbacks as investors may misinterpret the borrower’s quality due to being 
in a social network. Moreover, the virtual leadership of geographically dispersed teams 
may pose challenges to the monitoring process (Bell and Kozlowski 2002, Hill and Bartol 
2015). We add to this part of the literature by arguing that having a proper verification 
process may protect marketplace users and thus help mitigating the problem of 
information asymmetry.  
3.2. The Psychology of Rounding and Misreporting  
It is recognized that numbers ending in zero and five are more attractive to individuals 
than those with other rightmost digits (see, e.g., Tarrant et al. 1993, Schindler and Kirby 
1997), and that people tend to provide rounded responses to quantifiable questions even 
if an exact response is desired (Myers 1954). Behavioral theories suggest that the round 
number tendency arises due to the “availability heuristic” (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). 
Round numbers are cognitively accessible without the need to perform complex 
algorithms (Schindler and Kirby 1997), particularly in the case of large numbers (Kaufman 
et al. 1949). Moreover, rounding behavior may be caused by recall error (Wang and 
Heitjan 2008) or due to lack of information about the subject matter (Ormerod and Ritchie 
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2007). This implies that rounding behavior may indicate imprecision or uncertainty 
(Jansen and Pollmann 2001, Krifka 2002, Binder 2015).  
Rounding occurs predominantly in surveys or self-reported data (Pudney 2008, Manski 
and Molinari 2010). This natural behavior may lead to unusual patterns in the observed 
data and consequently, result in erroneous inference about the subject matter. 
Development economists and demographers observe extra spikes around certain 
numbers when people report age (Myers 1954, Zelnik 1961, Gráda 2006, A'Hearn et al. 
2009). They observe that rounding does not happen randomly, nevertheless, individuals 
exhibit preference for numbers ending in five or zero, which is explained by the “age 
heaping” phenomenon (A'Hearn et al. 2009). Binder (2015) finds that nearly half of the 
responses about expected inflation rate exhibit heaping behavior around multiples of five. 
Pudney (2008) demonstrates that the distribution of households’ expenditure significantly 
shows extra spikes at round responses. Furthermore, most of reported income data is 
rounded on one level or another (Schweitzer and Severance-Lossin 1996, Hanisch 
2005). Zinn and Würbach (2015) show that heaping around multiples of 1,000 increases 
with higher income. Similarly, Schweitzer and Severance-Lossin (1996) find that there is 
variation in rounding within different income levels.  
The financial market has also been subject to rounding (Niederhoffer 1966, Harris 
1991, Grossman et al. 1997). Bollen and Pool (2009) find that the distribution of hedge 
funds returns contains a clear discontinuity around zero; they suggest it is an indication 
of manipulation.10 Herrmann and Thomas (2005) find analysts’ forecasts for earnings per 
share persistently use 5-cent intervals. Additionally, they find that analysts who show 
evidence of heaping behavior tend to provide less accurate predictions. Dechow and You 
(2012) argue that rounding occurs when analysts do not have enough motive to exert 
more effort to obtain accurate information. Aitken et al. (1996) demonstrate that traders 
in the Australian stock exchange have a strong preference for prices ending in zero. Our 
paper contributes to the behavioral finance literature by providing evidence of the 
prevalence and consequences of rounding in the online market. 
                                                     
10 Carhart et al. (2002) and Agarwal et al. (2011) present further evidence supporting manipulation in hedge 
and mutual funds. 
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One would expect misreporting or manipulation to be prevalent when it is associated 
with better outcomes for the individual. For instance, hedge fund managers may have a 
greater incentive to manipulate performance reports as investors evaluate funds based 
on their progress and managers’ appraisal is usually based on the fund’s performance 
(Asness et al. 2001, Ben-David et al. 2013). Ben-David et al. (2013) support this claim 
by finding significant occurrence of manipulation in hedge funds that have more 
incentives to enhance their position compared to competitors. Moreover, managers may 
be motivated to manage corporate earnings upwards in order to maintain past 
performance, meet analysts’ forecasts and avoid losses (Degeorge et al. 1999). In the 
same way, individuals may manipulate information within loan applications such as 
rounding income in order to increase the odds of receiving funding (Dorfleitner and 
Jahnes 2014). Importantly, misreporting has been associated with adverse outcomes. 
Garmaise (2015) shows that borrowers who systematically misreport personal assets 
above round number thresholds are more likely to become delinquent11, and he 
concludes that the effect of misreporting is not reflected in the pricing of loans. We add 
to this part of the literature by offering evidence that borrowers who misreport by rounding 
their income tend to have better loan terms and that investors are not compensated for 
the extra risk. 
This paper offers insights into the behavioral aspect of online borrowers by considering 
studies that suggest there is a strong human tendency toward rounding. In order to 
understand the impact of rounding, we examine the link between reported income figures 
and associated loan outcomes. Borrowers may report rounded figures due to lack of 
information about their current financial position. What kind of signals do borrowers with 
inaccurate financial information provide? Gerardi et al. (2010) and Garmaise (2015) 
suggest that borrowers who are considered less financially informed and more cognitively 
constrained are associated with worse loan outcomes. Taken together, this suggests that 
borrowers who report rounded income figures may have worse loan performance than 
those who do not round.12   
                                                     
11 Piskorski et al. (2015), Griffin and Maturana (2016) find similar unfavorable performance for misreported 
borrowers in mortgage applications.  
12 This is considered in line with Garmaise’s (2015) interpretation of the above round-number threshold 
assets reporting by mortgage applicants. 
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4. Data Description  
4.1. LC Overview 
In this paper, we use a unique dataset from LC, the largest marketplace lender in the 
US. The data enable us to observe around 673,000 online loans throughout their monthly 
credit cycle, giving us information on almost 10 million observations. In order for an 
individual to qualify for a loan with LC, they need to comply with certain requirements. LC 
borrowers must be above 18 years old and meet the platform’s credit criteria. Normally, 
LC requires that applicants have a minimum FICO score of 660, a debt-to-income ratio 
of not more than 40% and a credit history for a minimum of 36 months.13 Moreover, 
applicants must have been the subject of no more than five inquiries in the last six months 
and have in their credit profile at least two revolving accounts.14 
If borrowers meet the eligibility criteria, LC offers them a fixed interest rate based on 
the assigned credit grade. The loan grades on LC range from A1 to G5 with a base 
interest rate between 5.32% and 30.99%.15 Additionally, the maximum amount of loan 
that a borrower can apply for is $35,000 with a maturity of either three or five years.16 
Potential investors may decide to fund parts of the loan, usually in increments of $25, 
based on their assessment of the loan’s characteristics and borrower’s credit history. LC 
investors are usually able to view each borrower’s credit history online. If there are 
enough investors willing to fund the loan, an intermediate bank originates the loan in 
agreement with the platform. In the final step of the lending process, the borrower’s 
monthly payment less servicing and other associated fees is distributed across 
investors.17 If the borrower fails to make payment on time, LC will attempt to recover the 
payments due. In case of successful collection, LC charges investors either 18% of the 
amount recovered if no legal action were taken or 30% of hourly lawyer fees. On the 
                                                     
13 FICO scores are claimed to be “the most-used credit bureau scores in the world… the standard measure 
of US consumer credit risk. They are used by lenders, rating agencies and the secondary market” (FICO 
2015). 
14 https://www.lendingclub.com/fileDownload.action?file=Clean_As_Filed_20140822.pdf&type=docs 
[Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
15  https://www.lendingclub.com/public/rates-and-fees.action [Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
16 LC charges borrowers origination fees of from 1.11% to 5.00%, which is paid when the loan is issued. 
17 LC charges investors 1% service fee of any borrower’s payment. 
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other hand, LC does not charge borrowers if they decide to repay the loan before its due 
date. 
 As part of the online application, applicants report their annual income beside other 
personal information. LC does not state a preference for whether the figure provided is 
actual or approximate. Thus, there is a high chance that borrowers misreport their income 
figures by providing rounded numbers. Furthermore, LC does not necessarily verify 
income and employment information for all applicants. If LC has targeted loan applicants 
for verification, it may verify either that their stated income is within 10% of actual income 
or their employment status. In both cases, LC grants applicants the loan. However, the 
first case falls in the “income verified” category and the latter falls in “income source 
verified” category. If LC chooses not to carry any verification on the borrower’s stated 
income, the loan is regarded as “not verified” and is granted.18 In the investor agreement, 
LC does not guarantee the accuracy of information provided by borrowers: rather they 
say that they carried out reasonable efforts to verify borrowers’ identity (Shubber 2016). 
Moreover, in their prospectus LC states clearly that there is high risk in investing in their 
notes as they may contain “unverified” or “inaccurate” information.19  
LC argues that they do not carry out income verification for all borrowers as it would 
result in a more cumbersome process and inconvenience to customers. Furthermore, 
they claim that the performance of both verified and unverified loans is substantially the 
same. However, what happens if reporting income rounded only to the nearest dollar 
results in a worse loan performance? According to LC’s policy, in this case the borrower 
is not penalized and is granted the loan since the reported income is still within 10%. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 https://www.lendingclub.com/public/income-verification.action [Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
19 https://www.lendingclub.com/fileDownload.action?file=Clean_As_Filed_20140822.pdf&type=docs 
[Accessed 07 June 2016]. 
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4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
The LC dataset gives information about each borrower’s credit history and loan 
characteristics obtained at the time of issuance of loans. Further, the data enable us to 
examine monthly performance of online loans that originated in the period between 2008 
and 2015. The monthly repayment status of each loan is disclosed, i.e. whether loans 
went into delinquency or default or were charged off. Additionally, we are able to consider 
borrowers’ uncertainty by examining monthly changes in credit score. Over the observed 
period, LC has provided loans in 51 US states. Around 15% of the loans were originated 
to borrowers located in California. About 35% of the borrowers are non-prime, 56% prime 
and 9% fall in the super-prime category.20 LC is noticeably growing over the sample 
period in regards of the number and amount of loans issued. It starts activities in 2008 
with loans amounting to around $5,818,000. Around 41% of the loans in our sample 
amounting to $4,213,309,000, were issued in 2015. 
Table 1 reports a detailed summary of statistics of most of the variables used in the 
statistical analysis. In the first part, we report loan specific characteristics. During the 
observed period, LC has originated loans with a total value of around $9,892,168,000 
with a mean interest rate of about 13.4%. The average loan value is $14,695 and the 
loans’ cycle is on average around 14 months. LC has recovered on average around 
$1,850 of defaulted loans’ principal and investors paid on average $203 collection fees. 
Around 22 percent of borrowers prepaid on average 63% of total loan amount. On the 
other hand, 5 percent of borrowers failed to pay back on average 76% of their loan with 
a mean value of $11,814 and around 2% are late in payment.21 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 We classify borrowers according to Elul and Tilson (2015) as follows: non-prime borrowers with FICO 
score between 620 and 679, prime borrowers with FICO score ranging between 680 and 739, and super-
prime borrowers with FICO score between 740 and 850. 
21 This makes the average delinquency rate for the whole sample around 7%. We define delinquency rate 
as the fraction of loans that falls in first-time delinquency. 
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Table 1    Summary Statistics. 
Variables Mean SD 25% Median 75% N 
 
Panel A: Loan Characteristics 
       
Loan Amount ($) 14,695 8,228 8,000 13,000 20,000 672,253 
Interest Rate (%) 13.350 4.341 9.990 13.06 16.29 672,253 
Loan Age (Months) 14.139 9.274 7 12 19 672,253 
Delinquency rate (%)  7.388 26.158 0 0 0 672,253 
Charged off Rate (%) 76.106 19.308 66.714 81.614 90.726 30,508 
Charged off Amount ($) 11,814 7,661 5,670 10,267 16,533 30,508 
Prepayment Rate (%) 63.104 28.057 44.757 70.668 85.899 146,545 
Recovery Rate (%) 15.488 11.788 13.883 14.339 17.990 16,332 
Principal Recovered ($) 1,849 1,889 603.29 1,354 2,586 16,332 
Collection Fees ($) 203.473 347.305 8.550 30.295 297.315 16,332 
    
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics 
 
Annual income ($) 73,394 40,435 45,000 64,500 90,000 672,253 
Credit Age (Months) 195 86.541 135 178 240 672,253 
Average FICO Applied 696.510 29.639 672 692 712 672,253 
Employment length (Years) 5.896 3.600 2 6 10 667,704 
Debt-to-income (%) 18.083 8.137 11.95 17.64 23.87 672,253 
Open credit lines 11.511 5.041 8 11 14 672,253 
Total credit lines 25.375 11.491 17 24 32 672,253 
No of Inquiries in last 6 Months 0.899 1.158 0 1 1 672,253 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 years 0.297 0.724 0 0 0 672,253 
Months since Last Delinquency 34.032 21.723 15 31 50 328,308 
Months since Last Record 71.491 27.829 52 71 95 102,201 
Last FICO SD 19.439 13.807 9.618 16.047 25.279 672,253 
Mean of Last FICO 702.761 40.053 676.445 699.5 726.861 672,253 
Notes. All observations are at loan level. Panel A includes variables that are related to loan characteristics. Loan amount 
is the funded amount by investors. Loan age is last observed month on the books for each loan. Delinquency rate is 
the fraction of loans that went into first-time delinquency. Charged off rate is the amount of loan that has been charged 
off in percentage. Charged off Amount is in dollar value. Prepayment Rate is the percentage of loan that has been 
prepaid by borrower before loan’s maturity. Recovery Rate is the principal that has been recovered successfully by LC. 
Principal Recovered is in dollar amount. Collection Fees are paid by investors to LC for recovering part/all of the charged 
off amount. Panel B lists borrower’s credit history and personal information at the time of loan’s origination. Credit age 
is the length of credit history in months; it is the time difference between borrower’s earliest credit line and loan’s issue 
date at LC. Average FICO applied is the credit score at the time of application. Last FICO SD is the volatility of changes 
in borrower’s monthly credit score. Other variables are related to the credit information pulled by LC at the time of 
origination. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 reports borrowers’ characteristics. A typical borrower at LC has at 
the time of the loan’s origination an average debt-to-income ratio of 18%, a FICO score 
of 697 and credit history length of 195 months. In the six months preceding the 
application, an average borrower has in total 25 credit lines with 11 lines currently open 
and around one credit inquiry. An average of 34 months has passed since her/his last 
delinquency and 71 months since the last public record. S/he has annual income of 
$73,400 and an employment length of around 6 years. The 36-month loans constitute 
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around 70% of the sample and 30% are 60-month loans, which were introduced and enter 
the sample in 2010. 
 
5.   Econometric Specification and Estimation 
The dataset used in this paper is an unbalanced panel data as the exit time for each 
loan is different; a loan can be prepaid, delinquent or charged off before its due date. 
However, for the implementation we only use one observation for each loan, as the main 
variable of interest is constant for each month. In this section, we start by defining the two 
measures of loan performance. In the second part, we define the estimation of income 
rounding. Lastly, we describe other models used to measure the performance of loans. 
5.1. Loan Performance 
In the first part of the analysis, we follow Jiang et al. (2014), Arentsen et al. (2015), 
Schmeiser and Gross (2016), and use a probit model to test the prediction that rounding 
has adverse effects on loan performance:  
 
                   𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 Ĩ𝑖 +  𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖𝛾 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑥 +  𝜀𝑖                            (1) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is a binary variable of whether loan 𝑖 becomes delinquent for the 
first time compared to loans that did not experience delinquency at any point. This is 
measured by loan delinquency. The available data do not state exactly how many days 
the loan has been delinquent; rather we have a loan status of 31 to 120 days.22 Therefore, 
we define loans as delinquent if they are 31-120 days late in payment, default or are 
charged off. We also measure 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  by the volatility of monthly changes in the 
credit score, which can serve as an indicator of borrower’s credit deterioration (Agarwal 
et al. 2006). Ĩ𝑖 is an indicator variable for whether the reported annual income is rounded 
to the nearest multiples of 5,000. According to Binder (2015), a dummy variable of 
rounding can be a simple measure of uncertainty. In the above model, we consider all 
loans, active and terminated. We further narrow our sample and run the model for only 
                                                     
22 Most of the literature concerned with mortgage loan performance tends to define a loan as delinquent if 
it is 60 days late in payment or more (Keys et al. 2010, Demyanyk and Hemert 2011). However, we are not 
able to differentiate these loans, as the data only enable us to observe delinquency as a status of 31-120 
days late in payment. 
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loans that are terminated through either paying back or charging off. This allows us to 
check whether results are driven by active loans. In our sample, around 30% of the loans 
has been terminated with 16% charged off and 84% ended their cycle by paying back.  
Lenders usually assign a credit grade for each loan based on a credit risk model that 
distinguishes borrowers who are more likely to make payments on time and fully repay 
loans (Crook et al. 2007). This model is partially based on the borrower’s credit report. 
Good credit borrowers are expected to have low debt-to-income ratio, long credit history, 
long employment duration and other previous successful credit lines. These borrowers 
are expected to be more prompt on their payments, therefore, 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a set of 
borrowers’ credit characteristics. While examining the impact of rounding on loan 
performance, we control for a number of variables. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖  is a vector of control 
variables that include origination year to account for any variation in the performance of 
specific loan cohorts. Additionally, we control for different types of borrowers by credit 
score groups in order to solely capture the risk of rounding and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  
 
5.2. Rounding Estimation 
If borrowers are cognitively constrained, one will find an overrepresentation of zero as 
number ending in numerical responses (Schindler and Kirby 1997, Kuo et al. 2015). 
Dehaene and Mehler (1992) attribute the overrepresentation of numbers ending in zeros 
to the saliency of round numbers. This overrepresentation may distort the income 
distribution by creating extra spikes at rounded values (Czajka and Denmead 2008). 
Figure 1 shows that there is apparent heaping in the distribution of income around the 
multiples of $5,000.23 Therefore, we use $5,000 as our rounding heuristic.  
                                                     
23 This interpretation is common in studies concerned about heaping in the observed data (Pudney 2008, 
Binder 2015). Further, Pope et al. (2015) carry out a graphical analysis to determine round numbers as 
focal points.  
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Fig. 1. Frequency of Annual income. 
 
Based on the graphical interpretation, we adopt a modified specification of Garmaise 
(2015) model in order to identify borrowers with rounded income figures. Annual income 
is normalized to the nearest multiples of 5,000, as follows: 
 
                      I = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 −  𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 5,000)                            (2) 
 
                                           Ĩ(1,0) {
1         If   Ĩ = 0    
 
0         If    Ĩ ≠ 0   
                                                                       (3) 
 
Where Ĩ is an indicator of whether the reported income is likely to be rounded to the 
nearest multiples of 5,000 or not. A normalized income of zero implies that the reported 
income is a rounded figure (Garmaise 2015). In our sample, around half of borrowers 
stated income amounts that is rounded to the nearest multiple of $5,000. The tendency 
toward rounding can be a function of borrowers’ financial expertise. Borrowers with longer 
credit history are expected to be more financially informative and thus, are more likely to 
provide a more accurate figure. Further, rounding over different threshold can vary with 
income level. 
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                                  P(Ĩ = 1) =  𝐹( Credit Age, Income , 𝑥)                                        (4) 
 
Equation (4) is estimated via a probit model, we consider multiples of $500, $1,000, 
$5,000 and $10,000 as different threshold of rounding. Credit Age is the length of 
borrowers’ credit history and Income is in quartile groups. 𝑥 is vector of control variables. 
 
5.3. Competing Risk Model 
The second set of analysis in this paper takes into consideration that a loan does not 
necessarily fall in only two categories but can have various outcomes. Borrowers may 
show inconsistency in their transition from one status to another. They may fail to make 
payments on time at any given point in their life but may recover and get back on track 
with their payments. Therefore, we distinguish between loans that were in delinquency 
but recovered later in their cycle and either went into continuous payment status or paid 
off from those who failed to recover and went into a worse status. Danis and Pennington-
Cross (2008) argue that it is critical for any predictive model to account for the different 
levels of delinquency and to identify their competing risk natures. Therefore, we employ 
a multinomial logit model to account for these different outcomes.24 The multinomial 
specification does not only account for the probability of several events occurrence but 
also consider the competing risk feature of these outcomes (D'Addio et al. 2005). Loans 
can be terminated through either paying off or default. These events are considered 
mutually exclusive events, since the occurrence of one naturally prevents observing the 
other event (Calhoun and Deng 2002).  
Therefore, Equation (1) is re-estimated using multinomial logit model, where the 
probability of observing outcome 𝑗 for loan 𝑖 is   
 
                 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑥𝑖) =  
𝑒
𝛽𝑗
,
𝑥𝑖
1+ ∑ 𝑒
𝛽
𝑗
,
𝑥𝑖𝐽
𝑘=1
              𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑗 ∈  [𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒1, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒2, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒3]                 (5) 
                                                     
24 Calhoun and Deng (2002) give a comparative analysis between different statistical models that are 
usually used in analyzing mortgage loan terminations and explain why a discrete choice model like 
multinomial logit model is the most appropriate for loan termination analysis. 
 18 
Where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of independent variables for loan 𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗
,
 is a vector of coefficients 
for each state of 𝑗. The possible states are current, delinquency, and paying off, 
respectively. Furthermore, in order to test the robustness of our model, we estimate a 
number of alternatives for model (5) by observing other possible states. We consider that 
a borrower may settle the loan and prepay it before the due date.  
In the last part of our analysis, we conduct several models to see if loans to borrowers 
who were associated with worse performance are adequately priced and their behavior 
is taken into account in loan terms. The price and non-price terms are normally used to 
manage and monitor borrower’s risk (Strahan 1999). Furthermore, information 
asymmetry problems in risky lending practices may be mitigated by having restrictive 
covenants (Ortiz-Molina and Penas 2008). For the pricing term, it is expected that risky 
borrowers be charged higher interest rate to compensate lenders for the extra risk of 
default. Additionally, risky borrowers may face tighter non-price terms by having shorter 
maturity and small loan to limit investors’ risk exposure. 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Income Rounding and Loan Performance 
In this section, we estimate the consequences of rounding in terms of loans that went 
into delinquency for the first time in their cycle compared with those who did not 
experience delinquency throughout their credit cycle. These tests take into consideration 
the previous argument that borrowers who misreport their income by means of rounding 
may have imprecise financial information and hence, may experience worse performance 
than those who report a more accurate figure. As expected, Table 2 shows that the 
propensity toward rounding decreases significantly for more experienced borrowers 
across different rounding thresholds. Furthermore, rounding varies significantly for 
different income levels, controlling for loans’ origination year. 
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Notes. This table presents the average marginal results of probit estimations. Where the dependent variable is one if 
the observed normalized income is rounded to the nearest thresholds. We consider multiples of 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 
10,000. The covariates used are the length of credit history in months and a dummy variable of income quartiles, where 
the 1st income quartile is the base group. We control for loans’ origination year. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The first specification in Table 3 shows the results for probit estimation that a loan will 
subsequently experience delinquency for the first time. We report the average marginal 
effects calculated around mean points using all loans in our dataset. As expected, the 
results indicate that the occurrence of rounding is associated with adverse outcomes. 
Borrowers who report a rounded income are almost 0.4 percent more likely to experience 
first-time delinquency than those who reported a more accurate figure, controlling for the 
credit score groups and origination year. Given that the average delinquency rate for the 
whole sample is 7 percent, detecting borrowers with misreported income may decrease 
the average delinquency rate by 0.4 percentage points. For borrowers’ characteristics, 
we find that a 1 percent increase in the debt-to-income ratio is associated with 0.2 percent 
increase in the probability that a current loan will experience delinquency. Further, having 
a long history of credit decreases the probability of delinquency and an increase in the 
number of delinquencies in the last 2 years increases the possibility of delinquency.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Rounding probabilities. 
  Round 500 
 
Round 1000 
 
Round 5000 
 
Round 10000 
 
     Credit Age    -0.036***    -0.037***     -0.046***    -0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income Quartiles 
2nd  Quartile     0.020***     0.018***    0.015***     0.114*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
3rd  Quartile     0.063***     0.066***     0.177***    0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
4th Quartile     0.039***     0.051***     0.186***     0.179*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control Variables 
Origination year 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 672,253 672,253 672,253 672,253 
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Table 3 Rounding and loan performance. 
Notes. The first model in this table reports the results of the average marginal effects from probit regression. In the first 
column, the dependent variable is one if the loan experience delinquency for the first time at any point of their cycle 
and the base category is loans that did not encounter delinquency throughout their credit cycle. In the second column, 
the dependent variable is one if the loan is terminated through charging off rather than paying back. The covariates 
include variables discussed in equation (1). Credits age, months since last delinquency, open credit lines and 
employment length are in natural logarithms. The second model contains estimates for the OLS model where the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly changes in the credit score. The 
covariates are the same as the first model. Both models are estimated for the full sample (column 1 & 3) and the sample 
of terminated loans column (2 & 4) with control variables including Credit score groups and loans’ origination year. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In the second specification, equation (1) is re-estimated for terminated loans. The same 
pattern is observed for the rounding indicator. As described in the second column of Table 
3, borrowers with misreported income are more likely to end up in default than to repay 
in full. The probability of a loan terminating through default for borrowers with rounded 
income is 1.2 percent higher than through normal payment. Similar to the whole sample 
findings, distinguishing borrowers who are more likely to give rounded income during the 
application process may decrease the average delinquency rate by 1.2 percentage 
points.  
       Model (1) Model (2) 
  
 Delinquency 
 
 
 Log (SD of FICO) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
 
   
Round Income     0.004***    0.012***    0.012*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Borrower Characteristics 
  
    
Debt-to-income ratio    0.002***     0.006***    0.002***    0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Age      -0.017***            -0.012*** -0.170***    -0.113*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Months since Last Delinquency     -0.003***     -0.007*** -0.039***     -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 years  
 
    0.003***      0.006**     0.029***    0.025*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
No of Inquiries in 6 Months     0.009***     0.013*** -0.004*** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Open Credit Lines     -0.003**     -0.007*      0.006 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Employment Length     -0.004***     -0.010***    -0.006*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
Control Variables     
FICO Groups Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Origination year 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Full sample 
 
Terminated loans 
 
Full sample 
 
Terminated loans 
 
N 326,478 85,861 324,122 86,716 
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The volatility of changes in monthly FICO can be a measure of borrowers’ uncertainty. 
In the second model in Table 3, our dependent variable is volatility measured as standard 
deviation. The covariates are the same as in the first model. Borrowers with rounding 
tendency experience higher fluctuations in their monthly credit score. The results show 
that the occurrence of rounding is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in credit score 
volatility. For terminated loans, the volatility of changes is doubled, reaching around 3 
percent for borrowers who have reported rounded income. FICO score can serve as a 
monthly indicator of the borrower’s willingness to repay back; thus, our results imply that 
borrowers who have a tendency to round face higher uncertainty in their ability to make 
payments promptly. Furthermore, borrowers with long credit history and employment 
duration are less likely to encounter changes in their credit score. In summary, when 
considering different measures of borrowers’ performance and uncertainty, we find that 
delinquency risk significantly increases when borrowers misreport by rounding their 
income.    
Next, we advance our analysis by taking into consideration the reasons for rounding 
and identifying whether the effects of rounding are the same among different categories 
of rounders. We decompose rounding behavior into that of “opportunists” and that of 
“recallers” by differentiating between groups that may have the incentive to strategically 
round and those that do not. “Opportunists” are likely to be less stable and more risky, 
and therefore, rounding by these borrowers could be strategic in order to look more 
appealing to lenders, while “recallers” are likely to be more financially stable and have a 
good credit history. Rounding by recallers is likely to be due to recall error. 
The “rounders” are grouped based on homeownership status. Unlike renters, 
homeowners are more geographically stable which in turn may affect many individuals’ 
behaviors and thus there are major differences between owners and renters (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999, Dietz and Haurin 2003). Furthermore, homeowners have higher life 
satisfaction, higher level of well-being and are happier than renters (Rohe and Stegman 
1994, Rossi and Weber 1996, Rohe et al. 2002). Lastly, owners are considered better 
citizens; they are more politically and socially involved in local communities as they are 
less inclined to move and have more financial responsibilities (Rossi and Weber 1996, 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999, Dietz and Haurin 2003). 
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Table 4 reports the effect of rounding by different groups of “rounders” on loan’s 
performance. In the first and third specification, we distinguish rounding by homeowners 
(“recallers”) and renters (“opportunists”). We find that rounding by renters has a significant 
impact on loans’ performance, but we do not find significant effects from rounding by 
homeowners. Borrowers who do round their income and are renters are about 1 percent 
more likely to experience first-time delinquency than renters who do not round. 
Furthermore, by limiting our sample only to loans that are terminated, we find that the 
probability of delinquency reaches about 2.5 percent. In the second and fourth 
specification, we further distinguish borrowers according to their credit score. Our results 
show that rounding by near-prime borrowers has a positive effect on loans’ delinquency. 
The probability of delinquency for borrowers who round and are near-prime reaches 1.3 
percent for the full sample and 3.3 percent for the sample of terminated loans. On the 
other hand, rounding by prime and super-prime borrowers does not have a negative effect 
on loans’ performance. Super-prime borrowers who report a rounded income figure are 
almost 4 percent less likely to go into delinquency for the whole sample and about 8 
percent for terminated loans. 
Our results suggest that rounding may result in worse loan performance. This is 
consistent with Garmaise’s (2015) findings for the default predictability of misreporting in 
the mortgage market and with Jiang et al. (2014) for the consequences of income 
falsification. But our results indicate that not all rounding will have a negative effect on 
loans’ performance. Rounding by less risky and more stable borrowers is associated with 
lower chances of delinquency. On the other hand, rounding by borrowers who are 
considered more risky and may have higher incentives to strategically round is 
significantly associated with higher chances of experiencing delinquency. While 
traditional lenders may use some behavioral indicators to assess borrowers (Moulton 
2007), the inconsistency in verifying self-reported data and the virtual aspect of the online 
market can make the situation more difficult. Therefore, distinguishing misreported 
borrowers and having a proper verification process of what the applicants self-report may 
help mitigate the risk of inaccurate disclosures in online lending.25  
                                                     
25 Garmaise (2015) suggest that targeting some behavioral bias like rounding may help reduce the 
asymmetry information problem. 
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Table 4 Rounding and loan performance (subgroups). 
 Delinquency 
(1) 
Delinquency 
(2) 
Delinquency 
(3) 
Delinquency 
(4) 
     
Home Ownership     
Round owner -0.000  0.003  
 (0.001)  (0.003)  
Round rent    0.010***      0.026***  
 (0.001)  (0.003)  
Credit Score 
  
    
Round near-prime     0.013***      0.033*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Round prime     -0.003***  -0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Round super-prime     -0.037***      -0.079*** 
  (0.004)  (0.012) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
    
Debt-to-income ratio    0.002*** 0.002***   0.006***    0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Age     -0.018***  -0.018*** -0.016*   -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Months since Last Delinquency   -0.004***   -0.004***    -0.009***     -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 years    0.004***    0.003***     0.007***   0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
No of Inquiries in 6 Months   0.009***    0.009***    0.015***   0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Open Credit Lines   -0.005***    -0.004***    -0.012***  -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employment Length   -0.004***   -0.004***     -0.009***  -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Control Variables     
Origination Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Full sample 
 
Full sample 
 
Terminated 
loans 
Terminated 
loans 
N 326,478 326,478 86,716 86,716 
Notes. This table provides loan performance results for the decomposition of rounding by different groups for the full 
sample and for the sample of terminated loans. In the first and third model, borrowers who do round are differentiated 
according to their homeownership status (owners and renters). In the second and fourth model, rounded borrowers are 
decomposed according to their credit score. Borrowers are classified into credit groups according to Elul and Tilson 
(2015). Where the base category for each group is non-rounder and the list of covariates are the same as discussed in 
equation (1). 
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6.3. Rounding and Loan Pricing 
Borrowers may round their income to seem more desirable to lenders. Jiang et al. 
(2014) show that borrowers’ income, with a major effect on loan terms and qualification, 
is the figure most subject to falsification. Thus, borrowers may alter their income figures 
in the hope of having higher loan amounts or lower interest rate. They may not have 
planned beforehand to misreport and may actually be willing to pay back the loan but will 
take the opportunity to receive better loan terms or increase their funding likelihood by 
rounding their annual income (Dorfleitner and Jahnes 2014).  
Our results suggest that rounding is associated with severe adverse outcomes. It is 
therefore, critical to scrutinize whether lenders are aware of such misreporting ex ante 
and if the pricing terms adequately reflect the increased risk. Table 5 addresses this by 
analyzing the pricing terms reflected in interest rate and the non-pricing terms reflected 
in loan’s size and maturity. The first two models are estimated via OLS regression and 
the last one via probit regression using the full sample and loans that completed their 
cycle, respectively. We control for the origination year and FICO groups as in previous 
models, except for the maturity model where we control only for FICO groups. 
We find a number of differences when we compare the results for borrowers who do 
and those who do not round their income. The first specification shows that borrowers 
who tend to round their income are charged a significantly lower interest rate than non-
rounder by twenty basis points and are associated with around an 8 percent increase in 
the loan’s size. A similar pattern is observed for the terminated loans sample. 
Furthermore, borrowers who round their income are more likely to have a 60-month loan 
term; however, this is not significant if only completed loans are observed. In summary, 
borrowers who round have a lower interest rate, larger loans, and longer maturity than 
those who did not round. These results imply that LC does not account for the prevalence 
of rounding in either the pricing or the non-pricing loan terms. Furthermore, loans with 
income rounding tendency are not priced in a way that compensate investors for the extra 
delinquency risk. 
 
 
 
 25 
Table 5 Rounding and Loan Terms. 
 Interest 
 
log (size) 
 
Maturity 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
       
Round Income  -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.008*** 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
 
  
   
Debt-to-Income ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
Credit Age -0.008*** -0.004*** 0.195*** 0.181*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Months since Last 
Delinquency 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.035*** 
(0.002) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
No of Delinquencies in 
last 2 year 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
No of Inquiries in 6 
Months 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
Open Credit Lines -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.242*** 0.261*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Employment Length 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Control Variables       
FICO Groups Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Origination year 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sample Full 
sample 
 
Terminated 
loans 
Full 
sample 
 
Terminated 
loans 
Full 
sample 
 
Terminated 
loans 
N  326,478 86,716 326,478 86,716 324,856 86,716 
Notes. This table reports results from several regression of an indicator of rounding and other borrower characteristics 
on different loan terms. The results of the OLS model with interest rate as a dependent variable is presented in the first 
two columns for the full sample and terminated loans sample, respectively. Similarly, OLS results of the natural 
logarithms of loan amount are reported in the third and fourth columns. The average marginal results of a probit model 
where the dependent variable is 1 if loan’s maturity is 60 month and 0 for 36 month is estimated in the last two columns. 
The regressions include origination and FICO groups as control variables for the first two models and only FICO groups 
for the last one. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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6.2. Competing Risk Model  
The competing risk model may provide additional insights as delinquent loans could 
either default or recover. Delinquency can be a turning point in loan’s performance; a loan 
that is late in payment may eventually survive or enter a worse status like default. In this 
model, we amend our earlier definition of delinquency by adding a restrictive condition: 
loans that fall in the delinquency category are those that have experienced delinquency 
for the first time and failed to recover later. In contrast to the previous model, current and 
paid off loans include both borrowers who did not fail to pay at any point and those who 
experienced discrepancy in their payment status at time 𝑡 but recovered at 𝑡 + 𝑛 where 𝑛 
is the last observed month for each loan. Given that we have three discrete possible 
outcomes for each loan, the competing risk model is estimated via a multinomial logit 
specification with the same covariates as were used in equation (1).  
The results for the competing risk model are consistent with the prediction that rounding 
behavior is associated more with inferior than with enhanced outcomes. The first model 
in Table 6 presents estimates for the full sample. Even after taking into consideration the 
volatility of transitions, borrowers with rounding behavior are significantly less likely to pay 
off loans. Furthermore, they are more likely to stay late in payment or enter a worse status. 
In the second model of Table 6, the option of prepayment is evaluated and the sample is 
limited only to terminated loans. The three possible outcomes are repayment, default, 
and prepayment, where the last is the base category. 
 The cost of prepayment is considered lower than default as investors only lose future 
interest payments, however, prepayment can imply that borrowers have enough liquidity 
to settle the loan. The likelihood that a loan will end up in default is significantly higher for 
borrowers who exhibit rounding behavior than it is for borrowers who are more accurate 
while reporting their income. They are significantly more likely to end their cycle through 
charging off than prepaying the loan. Furthermore, they are more likely to repay the loan 
at its due date, though the significance and magnitude of the repay coefficient is very 
small. The competing risk model confirms our results for the binary outcome model. 
Further, it proves that the occurrence of rounding is not only associated with an 
unfavorable loan outcome but also significantly lowers the likelihood that borrowers will 
pay back loans promptly. 
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Table 6 Competing Risk Model 
 
Notes. The estimates for the multinomial logit model are presented in this table. Observations are at loan level. The 
first model is estimated for the whole sample. The possible status for the first model are delinquency, paid off and 
continuous payment, where the latter is the reference category. The second model is evaluated only for loans that had 
a full cycle. The possible status are charged off, paid off and prepayment, where the latter is the reference category. 
The coefficients reported for dependent variables are a dummy variable for whether borrowers’ normalized income is 
equal zero and other borrowers’ characteristics at the time of loans’ origination with control variables including Credit 
score groups and origination year. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
       Model (1) Model (2) 
  
Delinquency      Paid off 
 
 
Charged off              Paid off 
 
                 
(1) 
     (2)              (3)                  (4) 
 
 
Round Income 
 
0.033* 
 
-0.062*** 
 
 
0.098*** 
 
0.043 
 (0.015) (0.010)  (0.019) (0.030) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
    
Debt-to-Income ratio    0.022*** -0.021***     0.045*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) 
 Credit Age   -0.391***  -0.278***   -0.071** 0.219*** 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.025) (0.040) 
Months since Last Delinquency  -0.034** 0.030***      -0.058*** -0.033   
 (0.012) 
 
 
(0.009)   (0.016) (0.027) 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 years 0.014 -0.038***     0.041** 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008)   (0.015) (0.027) 
 No of Inquiries in 6 Months     0.190*** 0.104***      0.090***   -0.132*** 
 (0.006) 
 
 
(0.004)  (0.008) (0.014) 
 Open Credit Lines 0.015 0.070***   -0.053* -0.114** 
 (0.019) (0.013)   (0.024) (0.036) 
Employment Length   -0.056*** 0.018**      -0.074*** -0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.006) (0.011)  (0.019) 
Control Variables     
FICO Groups Yes Yes Yes Yes 
origination year 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Full sample 
 
Full sample 
 
Terminated 
loans 
Terminated 
loans 
N 326,478 326,478 86,716 86,716 
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7. Conclusion  
It is apparent that borrowing and lending habits are changing at an unprecedented rate. 
Marketplace lenders are becoming an important part of the credit market. However, the 
rules of the game as well as the terms of loans have to be stipulated. Online platforms 
have special characteristics that distinguish them from traditional lenders. However, there 
is an increased risk and higher chances of misreporting in marketplace lending due to the 
online nature of the process and the inconsistency in verifying the supplied personal 
information of users. Using loan data from LC, we have examined the consequences for 
loan outcomes of the tendency to round self-reported responses. 
Our findings suggest that rounding behavior is prevalent in the online market and has 
severe adverse outcomes. Around half of borrowers in our sample have reported income 
that is rounded to the nearest multiple of $5,000. Furthermore, borrowers who are likely 
to report rounded income have higher chances of default compared to precise borrowers. 
The probability of first-time delinquency for borrowers with rounding tendency is 0.4 
percent higher than those without. This percentage considerably increases for terminated 
loans; misreported borrowers are 1.3 percent more likely to end their loan cycle in default 
than paying back. Considering the volatility of changes in credit scores, we find that 
rounding is extensively associated with higher fluctuations, and rounding by more risky 
and less stable groups of borrowers is associated with worse loan performance. 
We provide additional evidence of the adverse consequences of rounding by 
considering that a loan may experience first-time delinquency but borrowers may recover 
and stay up-to-date with their payment. Loans with rounded income are significantly less 
likely to pay off and more likely to experience first-time delinquency than to stay current. 
Limiting our sample to only completed loans we show that our results are consistent: 
borrowers who have rounded are less likely to prepay and more likely to end their loan 
cycle by being charged off. Lastly, by examining pricing and non-pricing terms of loan 
contracts, we show that investors are not compensated for the increased delinquency 
risk. The risk of misreporting income during the online application is not reflected in loans’ 
pricing. Borrowers who may have misreported their income by rounding are charged 
lower interest rate by around twenty basis points. Furthermore, they tend to have larger 
loan amounts and longer maturity loans.  
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Our results suggest that misreporting income by means of rounding may play a role in 
loans’ delinquency and that this could expose investors to extra risk, for which they are 
not compensated. This implies that there should be a more thorough check of the 
borrower’s application, specifically for self-reported data. Ignoring the occurrence of 
rounding in the reported data may result in an invalid judgment about borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Finally, having a unified verification process that tries to provide 
investors with as much accurate information as possible may help securing the online 
lending process. This could be done by outsourcing the verification process to a third 
party similar to the credit scoring process. Lastly, using technology for process 
implementation can heavily reduce the burdens for users. 
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Appendix (Not for publishing) 
 
Table A1 Rounding and loan performance (Subsamples). 
 Delinquency 
(1) 
Delinquency 
 (2) 
Delinquency 
 (3) 
Delinquency 
 (4) 
     
Round Income  0.004*** 0.005** 0.010*** 0.018** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Borrower Characteristics 
  
    
Debt-to-income ratio 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Age -0.015*** -0.027*** -0.013*** -0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Months since Last Delinquency -0.003*** -0.003** -0.007**   -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 
years 
0.003*** 0.002 0.005* 0.014** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
No of Inquires in 6 Months 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Open Credit Lines -0.004** -0.005* -0.007* -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Employment Length -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
 
Control Variables 
    
 
FICO Groups 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Origination year 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Sample 
 
Full sample 
36 month 
loans 
 
Full sample 
60 month 
loans 
 
Terminated 
loans 
36 month 
 
Terminated 
loans 
60 month 
N 228,462 98,016 67,114 19,602 
This table presents the results of the average marginal effects from probit regressions for full sample and terminated 
loans sample the first two columns represent the results for the subsample of 36-month loans and the last two for 60-
month loans. The list of covariates as described in equation (1). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A2 Rounding and loan performance (Subsamples). 
  
Log (SD of 
FICO) 
 (1) 
 
Log (SD of 
FICO)  
(2) 
 
Log (SD of 
FICO) 
 (3) 
 
Log (SD of 
FICO)  
(4) 
     
Round Income  0.013*** 0.007   0.027*** 0.028** 
 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
Borrower Characteristics 
 
    
Debt-to-income ratio 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Credit Age   -0.171*** -0.185*** -0.122*** -0.110*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) 
Months since Last Delinquency -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.023***   -0.011 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) 
No of Delinquencies in last 2 
years 
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) 
No of Inquires in 6 Months -0.003** -0.008*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Open Credit Lines -0.000 0.006 0.004 -0.024 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) 
Employment Length -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
 
Control Variables 
    
 
FICO Groups 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Origination year 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Sample 
 
Full sample 
36 month 
loans 
 
Full sample 
60 month 
loans 
 
Terminated 
loans 
36 month 
 
Terminated loans 
60 month 
     
N 226,773 97,349 66,470 19,391 
This table presents the results of the average marginal effects from probit regressions for full sample and terminated 
loans sample the first two columns represent the results for the subsample of 36-month loans and the last two for 60-
month loans. The list of covariates as described in equation (1). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
